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FOREWORD

One should empathize, if not sympathize, with NATO
force planners. Since 1991, standing and mobilization forces
made available by nations to the Alliance have been steadily
reduced. This particularly has been the case for land forces.
Equally important have been the structures the Alliance
has created into which national contributions would fall on
deployment. Military Committee (MC) 317, accepted by
nations in 1991, provides the framework by which the
Alliance organizes its forces.
However, the author of this study argues that the
structures and envisaged deployment framework for land
forces are a hopeless muddle. While there are arguably
sufficient reaction forces to support NATO Ministerial
Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would, and
indeed have, inhibited the efficient and effective
deployment of land forces in crises. More specifically, there
are insufficient deployable reaction headquarters, both at
the corps and component command level, that would
support a commander of a NATO Combined Joint Task
Force. And perhaps even more vexatious is the continued
existence of what has become atavistic “practices” of nations
that impede and inhibit the employment of multinational
land forces by an Allied commander.
The author observes that the NATO Force Structure
Review offers nations an opportunity to review these dated
structures, organizations, and practices. To be sure, he
argues, this, like the Long-Term Study of which this current
review is the third and final part, is likely to be protracted
and difficult. After all, the Alliance finds itself in this
situation by its own consensus of actions and policies.
However, collectively, the Alliance will soon have 10 years of
experience deploying forces to international crises which
should have had a salutatory effect on the thinking of
planners and senior level officials as well. Since the Force
iii

Structure Review is in its early stages, one hopes that this
monograph will be useful to those dealing with Alliance
affairs, as the review develops. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this report to better inform those
with an interest in improving NATO force structure.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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MULTINATIONAL LAND FORCES
AND THE NATO FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW

It is becoming increasingly obvious to NATO nations and
Alliance officials that the multinational land force
structures created since 1991 are not well-suited to meet
Allied strategy. 1 Three major problems predominate. First,
most existing multinational land headquarters and forces
were created with a view toward Article 5 missions (i.e.,
collective self-defense) and, in their present configuration,
are unsuited to undertake other new missions, i.e.,
non-Article 5 (e.g., peace-support operations). Second,
operating practices under which these headquarters are
currently “commanded” do not allow commanders to
exercise the command authorities required to prepare their
forces for their stated missions in peacetime, let alone
deploy them effectively in crisis and war. Third, there are
currently an insufficient number of reaction headquarters
and similar forces capable of supporting the force structure
benchmarks established by Ministerial Guidance for force
planning.
In the fall of 1994, an important initiative was launched
to begin the process of the Alliance’s internal adaptation.
This effort has become known as the Long-Term Study
(L-TS) of which the first stage consisted of the review of the
guidance for the implementation of the Alliance’s New
Strategic Concept (Military Committee—MC 400). MC
400/1 was endorsed in November 1995. 2 The second aspect
of the L-TS was the long and laborious effort to “reform” the
integrated command structure, which was finally
implemented on September 1, 1999. 3 The third and final
aspect of this effort to effect internal adaptation, the Force
Structure Review, aims to review force structure
requirements to support the new command structure and
ministerial guidance for defense planning.

1

This last review offers nations a unique opportunity to
address some of the issues that have led to the current
situation where force structure and practices do not
adequately support the “Alliance’s Strategic Concept”
released at the Washington Summit in April 1999. 4
However, for the review to help solve the three problems
listed above, strict parameters need to be established to
ensure that the review produces the results required to
realign multinational headquarters and forces declared to
the alliance. In this respect, addressing the problems
uniquely associated with multinational land headquarters
and declared forces needs to predominate. Land forces are
the most difficult to command in a multinational setting
given the requirement for multinational land force
commanders to exercise greater command authority over
the forces than is required for naval and air multinational
forces.
Therefore, the Alliance needs, for the first time, to
establish new parameters under which multinational land
headquarters and forces are organized, commanded, and
operated. It is not sufficient to review only “forces and
headquarters.” For without an examination of current
command practices (for want of a better word), little in the
way of real reform can result. In consequence, a number of
important questions need to be addressed.
1. What should be the basis of mission requirements for
multinational land forces declared to the Alliance?
2. Is there a level at which national contributions to a
multinational land force produce diminishing operational
returns?
3. Do current national practices for declaring forces to
multinational formations result in mismatches between
requirements and capabilities?
4. Where should existing multinational headquarters’
roles and missions be changed to improve the Alliance’s
overall capabilities to meet Ministerial Guidance?
2

5. Should existing structures be rationalized to create a
leaner force structure that better supports Alliance strategy
and Ministerial Guidance?
Mission Requirements of Multinational Land
Forces.
NATO does not suffer from a lack of multinational land
headquarters and formations declared to the Alliance.
There are currently six multinational corps (which includes
the ambiguously declared EUROCORPS) and four
multinational divisions declared to NATO. Added to this
body is an ever growing number of headquarters
established by nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP)
members (e.g., Multinational Peace Force South Eastern
Europe Brigade). However, the latter are predominantly
oriented to undertake peace-support operations, as opposed
to Article 5 missions. Significantly, they are not declared to
the Alliance, subject to the integrated defense planning
process, and therefore fall outside of the terms of reference
of the Force Structure Review.
Alliance strategy strongly endorses the concept of
multinationality. That said, the effective use of
multinational land forces is fiendishly difficult to achieve as
political sensitivities, national laws, and financial
regulations impede granting an allied commander the
command authorities normally given to a national
commander. 5 Given the steep diminution in the size of
NATO armies since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance
now heavily depends upon the existence and effective
functioning of the headquarters, should it ever deploy
forces. That said, the Alliance should insist, at a minimum,
that multinational land headquarters and subordinated
forces are made capable of undertaking the core mission of
the Alliance, i.e., Article 5 (collective self-defense). One
recognizes that peace support operations have taken on an
increasingly important role in Alliance defense planning
since the end of the Cold War and this venue offers a unique
3

opportunity to engage our partners in areas of mutual
benefit. Nonetheless, headquarters and forces declared to
the Alliance do not exist solely for the purpose of engaging in
peace-support operations, either exclusive of its partners or
with them. 6
The Force Structure Review, therefore, should establish
the baseline requirement that all multinational land
formations declared to the Alliance must be capable of
conducting collective defense missions. Any move away
from this standard might encourage nations to refocus their
attention and orientation away from the basis of the
Alliance. 7 Moreover, a headquarters and subordinated
forces capable of conducting collective self-defense
operations should also be capable of carrying out peace
support operations. Thus, the association of partner
multinational headquarters linked to existing
NATO-declared headquarters, while desirable and
worthwhile from the long-term perspective of the Alliance,
should not be allowed to interfere with their primary
mission of preparing to conduct collective defense
operations. Partners should be encouraged to contribute,
but they should be seen strictly as complementing, vice in
lieu of, forces declared for collective defense.
What is the Lowest Appropriate Level
for Multinational Land Formations?
National land forces declared to the Alliance range from
national corps (e.g., IV German Corps, Potsdam) to
companies contributed to the Immediate Reaction Force
(Land), an independent brigade-size formation (formerly
known as Allied Command Europe [ACE] Mobile
Force—Land). 8 Since one of the principal objectives of the
Alliance’s raison d’être is that nations declare forces to
members’ collective self-defense, allied commanders are
ill-positioned to refuse national declarations of forces,
irrespective of size. That said, sound military judgment
must be proffered that explains to nations and Alliance
4

officials the simple fact that there are disadvantages to
having formations made up of too many small contributions.
The simple reason for this is that nations have yet to come to
terms with the fact that multinational land formations are,
by their very nature, less efficient and less effective than a
similar pure national formation. Differences in language,
weapon systems, organization, logistics, and procedures, all
hinder the operation of multinational formations.
Compounding this truism is the added problem that the
procedures by which national armies are declared to
multinational headquarters have not changed appreciably
since the Cold War when nations’ contributions in the
Central Region were made at the national corps level; i.e.,
self-contained organizations. Thus, the nettlesome issues of
command authority requirements of a multinational force
commander, transfer of command authority from a national
to allied commander, establishing logistics and training
standards and priorities, etc., have yet to be revisited in
depth since the wide-spread introduction of multinational
forces in the Central Region. As a result, the Alliance finds
itself in the situation where it has transformed its
diminished land forces in the Central Region into
multinational formations that are largely unwieldy and
difficult to prepare for war in peacetime and command in
war.9
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Alliance is
hardly in the position to refuse forces declared by nations for
collective self-defense. Nonetheless, the Alliance should
establish more strict guidelines and measures that ensure
declared forces are capable of contributing to the Alliance’s
common objectives. In this respect, the suitable depth of
multinational formations should be determined by a series
of influencing factors, as opposed to arbitrary standards
nations are likely to oppose. The factors that determine the
smallest size of a land force contribution to a multinational
land formation are: (1) size of declared unit, and (2) the
command authorities granted by nations to the multinational force commander.
5

Apropos the question of establishing a threshold for the
minimum effective size of a force, the minimum size of
suitable forces declared to the Alliance should be, in large
part, a function of their intended mission, and related
readiness levels. Thus, the political value of a national
contribution to an Immediate Reaction Force (3-7 days
readiness), no matter how “small,” should be an overriding
concern, while mobilization forces can be expected to be
contributed in larger formations. A proposed generic
minimum standard might be:
1. Immediate Reaction Forces: select platoons, company
and battalion;
2. Rapid Reaction Forces: independent brigades with
organic logistics;
3. Main Defense: divisions with corps combat support
and combat service support; and,
4. Augmentation: divisions and corps.
Command Authorities.
The delegation of command authorities to multinational
land force commanders remains one of the least developed
areas of Alliance force employment policy (see Table 1).
Nations have been loath to give up command authorities
over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that, inter
alia, they will be “fragmented” or improperly commanded.
Yet, multinational land commanders require greater
command authority than they currently have over forces
due to the complex nature of land forces, as opposed to aerial
and naval units. More specifically, the missions and
inherent operational limitations of aircraft and ships are a
function of their very design. Land forces, on the other hand,
are combined-arms teams that need to be organized to
execute a mission. Thus, cross-assignment of forces (i.e.,
task-organization), the need oftentimes to change missions
rapidly to respond to a developing situation, and the
legitimate need for a commander to establish logistics
6

priorities are some of the more sensitive issues nations are
reluctant to give up to an allied commander.
1. Corps LANDJUT/"Multinational
Corps Northeast"
2. I German/Netherlands Corps+

OPCON/OPCOM*(in
wartime
OPCON (in peacetime)#
OPCOM (when employed)
OPCON (in wartime)
OPCON (in wartime)

3. V U.S./German Corps
4. II German/U.S. Corps
5. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
a. National Divisions
OPCON (in wartime)
b. Multinational Division (Central)+
OPCOM>^
6. 1st United Kingdom Armored Division OPCON (in wartime)
Danish International
Coordinating Authority
Mechanized Brigade
(in peacetime)
7. 3rd United Kingdom Division
OPCON (in wartime)
Italian Ariete
Coordinating Authority
Mechanized Brigade
(in peacetime)
8. 3rd Italian Division
OPCON (in wartime)
Portuguese Independent Airborne
Coordinating Authority
Brigade
(in peacetime)
9. European Corps (EUROCORPS)+
OPCOM (when deployed)
10. European Rapid Operational Force
OPCON (when deployed)
(EUROFOR)+
____________
* By agreement, Commander Corps LANDJUT has OPCON of forces
under his command. However, in exercises, it has been the tradition for
30 years for Commander Corps LANDJUT to exercise OPCOM.
+ “Force Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU).”
# The Corps Commander also now has “Integrated Directing and
Control Authority." This authority provides the Commander with powers
that are identical or similar to those vested in a commander of a national
corps or with powers that are altogether new. Note that sovereign rights
(in the narrowest sense) are excepted. That said, the Corps Commander
has the right to give instructions to all subordinate military and civilian
personnel and may issue directives to the binational and national
elements of the Corps and set priorities.
> Multinational Division (Central) headquarters is OPCOM to
Commander ARRC in peacetime.
^ Assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander ARRC in
peacetime.

Table 1. Command Authorities of NATO and
European Bi-/Multinational Formations.
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The proper place to analyze which command authorities
a multinational force commander requires (employing the
methodology employed by the 1994/5 Central Region-Chiefs
of Army Staff Talks [CR-CAST] Working Group on
Command Authorities Required by a Multinational
Commander—the only methodology developed to date in
this area) is with the assigned mission and an examination
of the mission-essential tasks (stated and implied)
therein. 10 (See Table 2 for definitions of NATO command
authorities.) Employing the CR-CAST methodology results
in the following minimum requirements for a multinational
corps commander.
1. Article 5 collective defense: operational command
(OPCOM).
2. Non-Article 5 peace-support operations:
a. Peace enforcement: OPCOM,
b. Conflict prevention: operational control (OPCON),
c. Peacemaking: OPCON,
d. Peacekeeping: OPCON,
e. Humanitarian aid: OPCON,
f. Peace building: OPCON.
The rationale for the requirement of a higher command
authority (OPCOM) in collective defense and peace
enforcement is due to the need to carry out combat
operations (the most difficult and demanding) and for the
commander to be capable of protecting the force. One should
note that under current NATO procedures, OPCOM cannot
be delegated by a Strategic Commander (he can only
delegate OPCON), without prior political approval by the
contributing nation. 11
In sum, given that multinational land forces declared to
the Alliance must be capable of conducting Article 5
collective self-defense missions, it is clear that the norm
governing the delegation of command authority to a
8

Operational Command:
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to
retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be
deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for
administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces
assigned to a commander. 01/08/74
Operational Control:
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so
that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy
units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those
units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment
of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself,
include administrative or logistic control. 01/06/84
Tactical Command:
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces
under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned
by higher authority. 01/09/74
Tactical Control:
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements
or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
01/11/80
Coordinating Authority (N.B: Not a command authority):
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned
responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities
involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or
more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the
authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or
their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel
agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved,
he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In
the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer
the matter to the appropriate authority. 01/07/85
Source: MC 57/3, Overall Organization of the Integrated NATO
Forces; and, AAP-6(U), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
(English and French), January 1995.

Table 2. Definition of NATO Command Authorities.

9

multinational force commander should be OPCOM (without
caveats), vice OPCON, with provision for revisions to the
definition to include new authorities over peacetime
training priorities and standards.
Multinational Practices Requiring Review.
Current Alliance procedures and the conditions under
which nations declare forces and headquarters to the
Alliance have not changed substantively since the end of the
Cold War, when multinational land formations were the
rare exception. As a result, a number of debilitating
practices and conditions combine to make successful
peacetime planning challenging and wartime operation
problematic.
An obvious weakness is the lack of sufficient Combat
Service Support (CSS) capabilities declared to formations.
With the sole exception of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
and Multinational Division (Central), no other
multinational land headquarters has specific corps/division
combat service support formations declared to the
headquarters. Given that logistics remain a national
responsibility (notwithstanding the efforts of CR-CAST and
Allied Commander Land Forces Central Europe
[LANDCENT] to introduce concepts of multinationality to
logistics), 1 2 the practice of not declaring specific
corps/division CSS formations limits effective peacetime
planning and, potentially, wartime operation. Nations have
had good reason not to declare specific CSS formations in
that they are often cross-assigned to other multinational
formations, or are treated as rare national treasures to be
parceled out grudgingly only when absolutely required. The
Alliance needs to consider establishing minimum CSS
standards by which nations declare forces to multinational
formations. As the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
demonstrates, combat forces without organic logistics and
CSS are of limited operational utility to the Alliance.
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Concerning the issue of command authorities, the
minimum requirements for the command authorities
required by a multinational land force commander were
addressed in the previous section. However, the Force
Structure Review should examine the definitions of
command authorities. The four recognized command
authorities (i.e., OPCOM, OPCON, Tactical Command, and
Tactical Control) have not been revised since the end of the
Cold War. 13 For example, two important issues for the
success of a multinational force are not covered by current
definitions. First, peacetime training remains a national,
vice Alliance, responsibility. A compromise solution would
be for the Alliance to establish an agreed set of tasks,
conditions, and standards. The Military Committee,
therefore, should direct the development of a robust
“mission-essential task list” for land forces which could be
used by multinational force commanders to validate
established training standards. 14
While perhaps only applicable to the 1 German/
Netherlands Corps where deep integration has been
established as an essential political objective, the
development by those two nations of “Integrated Directing
and Control Authority” may provide a useful example of
what can be accomplished in this area. This unique
command authority provides the Corps Commanding
General with powers that are identical or similar to those
vested in a commander of a national corps or with powers
that are altogether new. Of course, sovereign rights (in the
narrowest sense) are excepted from the commander’s
purview. That said, the Corps Commander has the right to
give instructions to all subordinate military and civilian
personnel and may issue directives to the binational and
national elements of the Corps and set priorities. 15
Second, closely related to the issue of command
authorities and training is the question of when do forces
“transfer” (“transfer of authority—TOA) from nations to a
multinational land force commander? It is unrealistic to
assume that nations will surrender the operational
11

employment of their forces well before their deployment.
Indeed, greater clarity in doctrine is needed as to when
forces should transfer to a multinational force commander,
i.e., prior to, or immediately upon, arrival in the theatre of
operations. Frictions between multinational force
commanders and nations can be expected until such time
that important issues like training priorities and standards
are addressed.
A final question relates to the lack of “interoperability” of
multinational land headquarters. There remains no
standard organizational “template” to which the
multinational land headquarters declared to the Alliance
adhere. As demonstrated in the Stabilization Force (SFOR)
experience, three NATO division headquarters were
deployed to the theater under the Allied Command Europe
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). These divisions included
subordinated forces with which these headquarters had had
no peacetime habitual training relationships (to include
units from non-NATO nations). Headquarters declared to
the Alliance, therefore, should be required to adhere to a
number of basic standards, the better to enable them to
integrate forces with which they do not have a peacetime
planning and exercising relationship.
1. Headquarters declared to NATO should have NATO
international legal personality to facilitate their
employment by the Alliance. 16 The NATO Status of Forces
Agreement should serve as the basis to govern the status of
foreign forces.
2. Headquarters declared to NATO should adopt as a
minimum those procedures and practices established in
formal Military Committee guidance to NATO Military
Authorities, NATO Standardization Agreements
(STANAGS), Allied Tactical Publication 35 (Land Force
Tactical Doctrine), and the planning guidelines emerging
from Bi-Major NATO Command working groups supporting
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept development;
e.g., “MNC’s Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP).” 17
12

3. Headquarters declared to NATO must use English as
the headquarters’ official language, with greater provision
for the use of French when requested.
Changing Roles and Missions of Existing
Headquarters and Forces.
Multinational corps in the Central Region were
established in the early 1990s to provide nations the ability
to operate competently within a corps structure, but with
smaller force structures. With the obvious exception of the
ARRC, all other multinational corps have an Alliance main
defense mission. Notwithstanding the fact that some have
the ability to engage in peace-support operations, the ARRC
remains the Alliance’s sole reaction corps.
There are currently insufficient suitable headquarters
and forces capable of supporting the force structure
benchmarks established by Ministerial Guidance for
defense planning. For example, the Alliance has created
three Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF)-designated
headquarters (Regional Commander North, Regional
Commander South, and Commander Striking Fleet
Atlantic). Additionally, guidance from ministers and the
Defense Review Committee hold that Strategic Command
Europe must be prepared to undertake two non-Article 5
contingencies, as well as a collective defense contingency. 18
Yet, the Alliance has available for rapid reaction missions
only two land component commands to support a CJTF, i.e.,
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps and the Immediate Reaction
Force-Land (the later of which is only capable of
commanding and controlling a large brigade). For this
reason, the Alliance has been forced to accept the use of the
EUROCORPS as a follow-on headquarters in Kosovo
(Kosovo Force—KFOR) 19 due to the lack of suitable reaction
headquarters declared to the Alliance. Thus, there is a
need for additional multinational land headquarters,
declared to the Alliance, with a reaction focus, vice largely
less useful headquarters and forces with main defense
13

missions. The very lack of a ground component headquarters for the entire ground operation in Kosovo was
singled out by Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe Admiral James Ellis as constituting a major
mistake in the conduct of the campaign against Serbia in
1999.20
Six points should guide the designation and creation of
new reaction corps headquarters.
1. There are existing corps-size multinational main
defense headquarters that could be redesignated to
command reaction forces.
2. There are sufficient reaction force divisions declared
to the Alliance generally to meet current Ministerial
Guidance 1999 requirements.
3. Reaction force divisions and corps CSS should be
declared to newly designed reaction corps headquarters to
ensure the development of habitual working relationships.
4. Efforts to create effective multinational land
formations heretofore have been almost exclusively limited
to Region North armies. The Force Structure Review offers
nations the opportunity to establish potentially similar
structures that offer many non-defense advantages in
Region South. Region North nations and armies, in
particular, should participate more actively in a Region
South reaction force headquarters and to declare reaction
forces and corps CSS in order to bring their technological
expertise and to contribute to establishing a conducive
working and operating environment.
5. The designation of certain headquarters as “light” and
“heavy” oriented would result in limiting Alliance
deployment options as opposed to increasing them. Reaction
force headquarters, perforce, must be capable of operating
within the full spectrum of missions and conditions.
6. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, any new
reaction force headquarters must adhere to the principles of
14

multinationality outlined above in order to be capable of
integrating subordinated forces and serving effectively as a
CJTF’s multinational land component command headquarters.
The Alliance should consider a multifaceted approach to
meeting the requirement for an increased number of
headquarters capable of serving as a land component
headquarters under a CJTF. Major political decisions need
to be made by nations and financial resources committed to
this objective if the Alliance is to achieve this ambitious
goal.
Options for Reform.
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). 21 The ARRC
(Mönchengladbach) has a proven record as a multinational
reaction force headquarters (Implementation Force [IFOR]
and KFOR operations) and is the only one with declared
corps CSS. That it remains largely British-dominated (60
percent of the headquarters is British) is a political
weakness that can be overcome by an increase in other
corps-sized reaction force headquarters. That said,
additional reaction force corps, perforce, should draw upon
the current unwieldy 11 divisions declared to it since it is
only capable of commanding four divisions.
V US/II German Corps. The U.S. Army in Europe is the
best prepared to conduct reaction force missions in Europe.
However, its corps headquarters, being national, would
require the most internal reform. Currently, in wartime, V
US Corps (Heidelberg) has a wartime arrangement to
cross-assign divisions with II GE Corps (Ulm). The Alliance
would be very well-served indeed if V US and II GE Corps
were merged, with the United States as the lead nation, and
transformed into an Alliance reaction force headquarters
with international personality. Divisions currently declared
to the ARRC could be reassigned to the new corps. 22
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1 German/Netherlands Corps. This formation (based in
Münster) was initially designed for main defense missions
and, in effect, to merge the two armies. However, the Royal
Netherlands Army is undergoing a significant restructuring and reorganization, the better to enable it to engage
in power-projection missions. The German Army has also
made progress in creating crisis reaction forces. Both
nations should strongly consider reorienting the
headquarters primarily toward a reaction force. The
headquarters’s strong adherence to NATO standards and
the use of English make it a highly suitable headquarters.
Divisions declared to the ARRC could be reassigned to give
it greater force structure depth. To be sure, it would be
unique in that it would not be a lead nation formation, but
rather bi-national.
EUROCORPS. Because this formation (located in
Strasbourg) includes the French Army, it offers
considerable operational advantages to the Alliance,
especially given France’s extensive experience in
power-projection. However, the French Army remains
equally unfamiliar with basic NATO procedures. An
example of its heretofore “distant” relationship with NATO
is that only as of September 1, 1999, was English made the
operational language of the headquarters. Moreover, the
corps is multi-roled, is not combat ready for use as a reaction
force, and enjoys, at best, an ambiguous relationship with
the Alliance. 23 The nations participating in this formation
could make a major contribution to the Alliance if they were
to: (1) clearly declare the headquarters to the Alliance, (2)
reorganize the headquarters to adhere to standards
outlined above, and (3) adopt, unambiguously, a reaction
force mission and orientation.
Probably the Alliance’s biggest challenge is to establish a
reaction force headquarters that fosters improved
interoperability among Region South armies. Traditionally,
the armies of this region have had limited opportunity to
work together in a peacetime multinational setting, let
alone on deployment. And, indeed, the decision by the
16

Alliance not to create land component commanders in
Regions North and South (whereas there are air and sea
component commanders) places obstacles in the path of
improving this situation. As a result, there will not be a
suitable land-focused headquarters acting to integrate
armies during peacetime, let alone providing a capability to
the Alliance to act as a land component command under a
CJTF. Nonetheless, at the level of forces and headquarters,
the Alliance can work to overcome this current lack of
multinationality. The most obvious option relates to the
European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR—
Florence), a division-size headquarters currently not
declared to the Alliance. Participants include Italy, France,
Spain, and Portugal. As is the case with the EUROCORPS,
the current status of EUROFOR contributes little to
Alliance preparations and planning, although it has
potential. Being in Italy, it is located in the central
Mediterranean and enjoys modern and extensive
infrastructure. Greece and Turkey should be encouraged to
declare reaction forces to it. The headquarters should: (1) be
expanded eventually to the size of a corps staff, (2) be
declared to the Alliance, (3) be reorganized to adhere to
standards for headquarters outlined above, (4) assign North
American and Region North staff officers to the
headquarters, and, in time, (5) declare to it North American
and Region North forces.
Rationalization of Headquarters?
The above analysis intentionally did not address the
suitability of Multinational Corps North East (Stettin) and
IV GE Corps (Potsdam). There is merit in maintaining a
number of multinational corps with largely a main defense
orientation. However, those formations that retain this
mission-orientation would contribute greatly to the
Alliance’s main defense capabilities by inviting the armies
of the new members to declare forces to the formations and
participate in the headquarters’ staffs. Other Alliance
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members should second staff officers also to these
formations and contribute to their operation.
The Way Ahead.
Nations face considerable challenges in reforming the
structures and practices regulating the operation and
command of multinational land headquarters. The Force
Structure Review offers a unique opportunity for nations to
reexamine these problems and lacunae in stated Alliance
strategy and Ministerial Guidance on the one hand and
current structures and capabilities on the other. On the
negative side of the task, nations have traditionally been
reluctant to offer up land forces to foreign commanders and
national laws make a multinational land force commander’s
influence over such issues as logistics, challenging at best.
However, on the positive side, there is little need for nations
to create new forces and headquarters. Rather, they need to
reexamine the missions of current existing headquarters.
That said, let there be no doubt that without a fresh review
of the practices and authorities under which multinational
land force commanders currently command their forces, a
mere redesignation of headquarters’ missions will be for
naught.
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